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Abstract 
 
 
Title:   How Does Board Structure Influence CEO Compensation?  
– Evidence from Sweden 
 
Seminar date: 18-01-2006 
 
 
Course: FEK 591 Master thesis in business administration,  
10 Swedish Credits (15 ECTS) 
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  Lina Johansson  
 
 
Advisor:  Maria Gårdängen  
   
 
Five key words: Board Structure, CEO Compensation, Corporate Governance, 
Cross-sectional Regression, Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
Purpose:  The purpose of the study is to investigate how board structure 
influences CEO compensation for companies listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange in 2004.  
 
 
Methodology:  Cross-sectional regression analysis, OLS, significance test, control 
variables 
 
 
Theoretical perspectives: The theoretical frame of reference is based upon the corporate 
governance theory, the principal-agent theory and previous 
empirical research in the area. 
 
 
Empirical foundation: The study is based on information regarding CEO compensation, 
and possible factors affecting the compensation, from 267 
companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange A- and O-list 
in the year 2004.     
 
 
Conclusions: We find that the board structure has no significant effect on the 
CEO compensation. Instead, the firm size, as measured by the 
firm’s total assets, number of employees and whether any CEO 
stock options exist are strongly significant determinants for CEO 
compensation.  
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Sammanfattning 
 
 
Uppsatsens titel: Hur påverkar styrelsesammansättningen VD lönen? 
  – Bevis från Sverige 
 
Seminariedatum: 2006-01-18  
 
 
Ämne/Kurs:  FEK 591 Magisteruppsats, Finansiering  
10 akademiska poäng (15 ECT) 
 
 
Författare:  Fredrik Axelsson 
Lina Johansson 
 
 
Handledare: Maria Gårdängen 
 
 
Fem nyckelord: Styrelsesammansättning, Vd lön, Corporate Governance, 
Tvärsnittsregression, Svensk Kod för Bolagsstyrning 
 
 
Syfte: Undersökningens syfte är att studera hur styrelse-
sammansättningen påverkar VD lönen i företag noterade på 
Stockholms börsen under 2004. 
 
 
Metod:  Tvärsnittsregression, OLS, signifikanstest, kontroll variabler 
 
 
Teoretiskt perspektiv: Grunden till den teoretiska referensramen utgörs av corporate 
governance teorin, principal-agent teorin samt tidigare forskning 
inom området 
 
 
Empiri: Undersökningen grundar sig på information avseende VD lön, 
samt möjliga påverkande faktorer på lönen, från 267 företag 
noterade på Stockholmsbörsens A- och O-lista under år 2004.  
 
 
Slutsatser: Styrelsesammansättningen har inte någon signifikant effekt på Vd 
lönen. Däremot finner vi att företagets storlek, mätt i totala 
tillgångar, antal anställda samt huruvida VD:n har tilldelats några 
optioner är starkt signifikanta faktorer för VD lönen.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with the background of the subject area, followed by problem discussion, 
which leads to a definition of the purpose of the study. The chapter ends with the delimitations 
and the disposition of the study.  
 
1.1 Background 
 
Corporate governance, which is the basis for accountability in companies, is today a well 
discussed and well-known topic, and a proper governance framework is of fundamental 
importance in strengthening the performance of economies and discouraging fraud and 
mismanagement (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), 2005). The purpose of 
corporate governance is to create confidence and trust in both companies and markets. 
However, corporate governance is an integrated and complicated system, with intertwined 
potential incentives for executives, auditors, boards, banks and so on to misbehave. Large 
corporate scandals, such as the Enron case in the U.S. and the Skandia case in Sweden where 
many shareholders lost their personal wealth, also lead to mistrust against the corporate 
governance system. (Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p xi) 
 
The general public has started to pay more attention to corporate governance and its oversight 
role, mainly as a result of the recent corporate scandals and the increasing merger & 
acquisition activity (Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p 31-32). However, it is not only the general 
public that is concerned about corporate governance, also governments have started to pay 
more attention, and as a result many countries have developed codes for corporate 
governance. One of the main purposes with these codes is to enhance corporate governance 
and thus, hopefully, re-create the public confidence and trust in the business industry 
(Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004)1.  
 
One part of the corporate governance system is the board of directors, whose main objective 
is to represent the interests of the shareholders, with the functions of hire, evaluate and fire 
top management; vote on major operating proposals; vote on major financial decisions; and 
offer expert advice to management (Ogden, Jen & O´Connor, 2003, p 238). However, 
sometimes the oversight role of the board of directors face potentially problems, such as lack 
of board interdependence from the CEO, directors that are too busy too fulfil their roles and  
lack of vested interest in the firm (Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p 31-32).  
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
When managers have different incentives than shareholders, such as a higher and more secure 
income, a principal-agent conflict2 arise (Ogden et al, 2003, p 139). According to theory it is 
the firm’s board of directors who should mitigate such conflicts of interest by monitoring 
management decision (ibid). However, in recent years CEO compensation, in some firms, has 
sky-rocketed and thus become the subject of both media commentators and academic 
researchers (e.g. Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999; Cahan, Chua & Nyamori, 2005; Dagens 
Industri, 2005; among others). A high CEO compensation can bee seen as a result of weak 
                                                
1
 See 3.3 Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. 
2
 See 3.4 Principal-agent theory. 
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oversight by the board of directors, and has thus led to renewed criticism of the corporate 
model for public sector entities (Cahan et al, 2005).  
 
The effectiveness of the board of directors has been the subject of numerous studies. Some of 
the earlier studies, such as Crystal (1991) and Jensen (1993), argued that the board of 
directors are ineffective, partly due too the size of the board and the fact that outside directors 
are hired by the CEO, respectively. Later studies, such as Yermack, 1996; Oxelheim & 
Randøy, 2003; Ho & Williams, 2003; among others, have focused on board effectiveness 
from various perspectives, such as the impact of foreign board membership on firm value and 
the relation between board features and performance. 
 
It could easily be argued that the board of directors should play a critical role in monitoring 
the CEO performance, since one of the board’s fundamental role is: “hiring, compensating, 
and if necessary, firing senior management” (Ogden et al, 2003, p 238). The relation between 
board effectiveness and CEO compensation have been examined in several studies (e.g. Cyert, 
Kang, Kumar & Shah, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Talmor & Wallace, 2000; Cahan et al, 2005;)3, 
where for example Core et al (1999) believe that an ineffective board will pay higher CEO 
compensation than an effective board.  
 
The literature regarding the board of director’s influence on a firm is rather extensive, 
however there are quite few studies done in Sweden. Becker, Bjerke, Waldenström & 
Wallmark (2005) investigated whether diversification within the board composition in 
Swedish firms is a success factor, Durante, Faasth & Omeragic (2005) studied the effect 
women directors have on firm value in Swedish firms and Levin (2005) examined the 
composition and function of boards of social enterprises in Sweden. Oxelheim & Randøy 
(2003) and Ho & Williams (2003) looked at the board composition and its effect on firm 
value for Swedish firms.  
 
Most of the relevant studies are performed in the U.S., where the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system4 is dominating. As far as we know, no one has studied the relationship 
between the board structure and CEO compensation within companies listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange. Since companies listed in Sweden mainly are characterized by 
the Germanic system with a two-tier board, as opposite to the one-tier board5 employed by the 
Anglo-American corporations, it could be argued that there would be differences in the 
oversight role by the board of directors, and thus also in the CEO compensation, between 
companies with different corporate governance system.  
 
Based on the problem discussion above, we consider the board structure’s influence on CEO 
compensation in companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, to be unclear. This, 
together with the lack of previous research within the subject area, leads us to the following 
issue: 
 
• How does board structure influence CEO compensation? 
 
 
                                                
3
 See 3.5 Previous research. 
4
 See 3.2 Different corporate governance systems. 
5
 In the one-tier board, executive and supervisory responsibilities of the board are condensed in one legal entity 
(Weimer & Pape, 1999). 
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1.3 Purpose 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate how the board structure, for companies listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange in 2004, influences CEO compensation. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
The study includes companies listed on the A- and O-list on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, 
as of December the 31st 2004. The study encompasses the relationship between board 
structure and CEO compensation for the year 2004. Included in the CEO compensation is 
base salary, annual bonus and other remunerations, but not the value of any stock options 
aimed at the CEO6.  
 
1.5 Outline 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter begins with the background of the subject area, followed by problem discussion, 
which leads to a definition of the purpose of the study. The chapter ends with the 
delimitations and the disposition of the study.  
 
2. Methodology and Data Description  
An outline of the methodology and a description of the data, as well as the selection process, 
are presented in order to facilitate the following analysis of the results from the study.   
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter we present the theoretical frame of reference, which underlie our analysis. We 
begin with a discussion about the concept of corporate governance, which is followed by 
relevant theory and previous research within the subject area.   
 
4. Development of Hypotheses and Descriptive Statistics 
The variables of the cross-sectional regression are presented, hypotheses for each independent 
variable are developed and a summary of the statistics for CEO compensation and all 
independent variables is presented.   
 
5. Results and Analysis 
In this chapter the results from our study are presented and analysed, based on the theoretical 
framework.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this chapter the conclusions from our study and proposals about additional research are 
presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6
 See 4.1 Dependent variable 
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2. Methodology and Data Description  
 
An outline of the methodology and a description of the data, as well as the selection process, 
are presented in order to facilitate the following analysis of the results from the study.   
 
2.1 Background 
 
In order to achieve the purpose of our study, i.e. how board composition influence CEO 
compensation, we use a multiple cross-sectional regression analysis. With a regression 
analysis it is possible to describe and evaluate the “relationship between a given variable and 
one or more other variables” (Brooks, 2003, p 42). Since our study includes several 
independent variables, a multiple regression, which relates a given dependent variable to 
several independent variables (Ramanathan, 1998, p 157), is used7. Further on, our data 
represent observations collected “at a given point in time” and is thus cross-sectional data 
(ibid, p 13).  
 
Our choice of a multiple cross-sectional regression analysis is supported by the fact that it is a 
commonly used approach in financial research. The fact that previous researches, focusing on 
how board composition affects CEO compensation, have used a multiple cross-sectional 
regression analysis (Cyert et al, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Talmor & Wallace, 2000; Cahan et al, 
2005) further support our choice of regression model.  
 
2.2 Implementation of the Model 
 
To enhance the understanding of the methodology, we will below give an account of the 
procedure used in the study.  
 
2.2.1 Formulating the Model  
 
The general specification of the dependent and independent variables in a multiple regression 
model may come from economic theory, past experience, other studies or intuitition 
(Ramanathan, 1998, p 157). The dependent variable is the variable whose behaviour the 
researcher is interested in explaining, while the independent variables are those that influence 
the dependent variable (ibid, p 6).  
 
The dependent variable in our multiple regression model is CEO compensation, since the 
purpose is to study how CEO compensation is influenced by board composition. Based on 
theory and previous research8 in the area, we include a number of independent board 
composition variables as well as independent control variables. Altogether, we choose to 
                                                
7
 See 4.1 Dependent variable and 4.2 Independent variables. 
8
 See 3. Theoretical framework. 
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include five board composition variables and five control variables9, which leads us to the 
following formula, based on Ramanathan (1998, p 157)10: 
 
 
Formula (2.1) 
 
Y  =  β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + 
        β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + β9X9 + β10X10 + ε  
  
2.2.2 Selection Criteria 
 
Our original sample consists of all companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange’s A- 
and O-list as of December the 31st 2004, a total of 274 companies. In order to collect the data 
for the dependent and independent variables we downloaded each company’s annual report 
for the year 200411.  
 
Three of the variables in our study are based on the companies cost and revenues. Most 
companies included in the study report this information in SEK, but for the companies who do 
not, an exchange rate is used to convert the currency into SEK12. For the CEO compensation 
and operating profit we use the average currency rate for 2004, while total assets is converted 
using the currency rate as of December the 31:th 200413. 
 
Out of our original sample of 274 companies, seven companies were eliminated, which left us 
with a total of 26714 companies to include in the study. As can be seen in Table 2.1, four 
companies were eliminated because we were not able to find their annual report for 2004. 
Another three companies were eliminated due to lack of information in their annual report.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Eliminated Companies* 
 
Company Reason for elimination 
B&N Nordsjöfrakt No annual report available (Delisted 2005) 
Song Networks Holding No annual report available (Delisted 2005) 
TurnIT No annual report available (Delisted 2005) 
Tivox No annual report available (Bankruptcy) 
Lundin Mining Information about number of employees missing 
Maxim Information about number of employees missing 
Oxigene Information about board of directors missing 
* We tried to collect the annual reports and missing data by e-mail, with no response 
 
 
 
                                                
9
 A common approach, when conducting a multiple regression analysis, is to classify the independent variables 
into different categories, see 4.2 Independent variables.  
10
 β0  is the intercept  and  ε is the error term, which is the difference between the actual value of Y and the value 
fitted by the model (Brooks, 2003, p 47). 
11
 For U.S. companies, listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, also the proxy statement was collected, since 
information about CEO compensation is not presented in the annual report. 
12
 See Appendix A for the exchange rates used in the study. 
13
 One company had broken financial year, thus we used a different conversion rate for that company. 
14
 See Appendix B for a complete list of all 267 companies included in the study. 
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To be able to generalize the results from the study, it is important that the final sample is 
representative (Bryman & Bell, 2003, p 81). The fact that the original sample consists of all 
companies listed on the A- and O-list in 2004, and only seven companies were eliminated, 
makes us believe that our final sample is unbiased due to the low reduction of companies. 
 
The reliability of the study may have been negatively affected by the fact that companies 
present the information about the CEO compensation differently, e.g. sometimes benefits such 
as free car is included in the CEO compensation, and sometimes it is not. Further more, it is 
not always clearly stated in the annual report whether the CEO has been compensated with 
stock options. In the cases where no information about such options has been found, we 
assume that no CEO stock options exist. However, the fact that the annual reports have been 
submitted by authorized public accountants should strengthen the reliability of our data. 
 
In order to get as recent data as possible, we choose 2004 to be the year for our study. The 
fact that only one year is studied, due to the time perspective, may have limited the ability to 
generalize our results.  
 
2.2.3 Estimating the Model and Interpreting the Result 
 
After gathering the necessary data for the dependent and independent variables, the next step 
is to estimate the model. The most frequently used estimation procedure, in order to fit a line 
to the data, is the method of least squares, more commonly known as OLS15. By using OLS it 
is possible to determining the appropriate value of the intercept, β0, and the value of each 
independent variables slope coefficient, β1, β2…β10. (Ramanathan, 1998, p 88; Brooks, 2003, 
p 46) In order to estimate the intercept and the slope coefficient from the multiple cross-
sectional regression analysis the econometric software program EViews is used. The value of 
the intercept and the slope coefficient is used to interpret and analyse each independent 
variables influence on CEO compensation16.  
 
To make sure that the results does not occur just by chance, a significance test is conducted, in 
which a null hypothesis (H0) and an alternative hypothesis (HA) are formulated for each 
independent variables. We tested the null hypothesis with a 99-percent significance level, in 
order to see how strong the evidence is against the null hypothesis, with the purpose of 
finding evidence that support the alternative hypothesis17. The smaller the P-value, i.e. the 
probability that the null hypothesis is true, the stronger is the evidence against the null 
hypothesis18. (Moore, 2000, p 320) Since hypotheses are developed, based on theory and 
previous research in the area, the study is characterized by a hypothetic-deductive study19 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003, p 9).  
 
 
 
                                                
15
 OLS stands for Ordinary Least Squares and the OLS procedure finds the straight line which is closest to the 
data (Ramanathan, 1998, p 88). 
16
 See Table 5.1 Regression of CEO compensation. 
17
 With the use of statistical significance tests, it is possible to increase the credibility of the results (Denscombe, 
2000, p 240). 
18
 The results from the significance test, indicated by the t-value and the probability, are presented in Table 5.1 
Regression of CEO compensation. 
19
 In a hypothetic-deductive study hypotheses are developed, a deductive inference is made and a test whether 
the premises is consistent with reality is made (Thurén, 2002, p 25). 
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2.2.4 Assumptions Underlying OLS  
 
Before any interpretation of the results from the regression can be made, it is important to 
determine how “good” the model is. Below, we will thus discuss nine assumptions underlying 
the multiple linear regression model, as proposed by Ramanathan (1998, p 84).  
 
 
Assumption 1 – Linearity 
 
A fundamental assumption underlying the linear regression model is that the appropriate 
“functional form” is linear, i.e. that the relationship between y and x can be represented by a 
straight line (Ramanathan, 1998, p 84). One way of testing the linearity is by using Ramsey’s 
RESET test20, which is a general test for misspecification of the functional form (Brooks, 
2003, p 194). In order to be sure that the data are linear, Whites heteroscedasticity test21 
including cross terms, can be run as a complementary test, since a strong significance could 
indicate that the model is non-linear. A model that is non-linear in the parameters exclude the 
use of OLS, and require the use of a non-linear estimation technique (Brooks, 2003, p 195).  
 
 
Assumption 2 – Variation in x 
 
The second assumption is that at least one of the values of x is different from the others, i.e. 
that the sample variance is not serial. If this assumption is not fulfilled the model cannot be 
estimated, because if x does not vary we cannot explain why y varies. (Ramanathan, 1998, p 
92) 
 
 
Assumption 3 – Errors Average to Zero 
 
The line in the linear regression model represents the average line, why it is reasonable to 
assume that the random errors cancel out on average, and therefore the assumption that the 
error term is a random variable with the expected value of zero is realistic. (Ramanathan, 
1998, p 94) According to Brooks (2003, p 146) the assumption that the average value of the 
errors is zero is never violated as long as there is a constant term included in the regression 
equation.  
 
 
Assumption 4 – Xs are Given and Non-random 
 
The fourth assumption is that the x variate and the error term are independent of each other. If 
x and the error term are correlated, a change in x will lead to a change in the error term and y 
will not be an average line. However, if x is non-random, the conditional expectation of y for 
a given x will be the average line. (Ramanathan, 1998, p 94)  
 
If assumption three and four holds the least square estimators are considered to be unbiased, 
i.e. that the estimated values of β0 and β1, β2…β10 on average equals their true values 
(Ramanathan, 1998, p 95). Although an unbiased model is desirable, it does not necessarily 
make an estimator “good”. Thus, a second criterion, consistency, is needed in order to decide 
whether an estimator is “good”. The consistency property means that the estimate converges 
to its true value as the sample size increases to infinity. If assumption two also holds, in 
addition to assumption three and four, the estimator is considered to be consistent. (ibid, p 97) 
 
 
                                                
20
 Ramsey RESET test is only applicable to an equation estimated by least squares (EViews, 2005).  
21
 See assumption five for discussion about heteroscedasticity. 
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Assumption 5 – Homoscedasticity 
 
The fifth assumption, that the variance of the errors is constants, is called the assumption of 
homoscedasticity, i.e. that all of the error terms are identically distributed with the same 
variance (Ramanathan, 1998, p 97). If the errors are not constant, they are said to be 
heteroscedastic, which means that the variance is increasing with x (ibid, p 98). If OLS is still 
used in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the standard errors could be wrong and any 
inferences made could be misleading. To test whether the variance of the errors is constant or 
not, White’s test for heteroscedasticity22 can be used. If there is a problem with 
heteroscedasticity, the regression can be run once again, but now including White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error estimates23, which solves the heteroscedasticity 
problem. (Brooks, 2003, p 152)  
 
 
Assumption 6 – Autocorrelation 
 
If the errors are correlated with one another, there is a problem with the sixth assumption, 
which is the assumption of autocorrelation. The consequences of ignoring autocorrelation is 
similar to those of ignoring heteroscedasticity, and could lead to wrong inferences about 
whether a variable is an important determinant of variations in y. However, the possibility of 
autocorrelation is very high in the context of a time series regression, but less likely in a 
cross-sectional regression. (Brooks, 2003, p 155,177) 
 
If assumptions two to six holds, the ordinary least squares estimators are considered to be 
most efficient among the unbiased linear estimators. Thus, the OLS procedure gives the best 
linear unbiased estimates (BLUE). 
 
 
Assumption 7 – Number of Regression Coefficients 
 
The number of regression coefficients must be less than the number of observations, 
otherwise the estimated variance can be undefined or negative (Ramanathan, 1998, p 100).  
 
 
Assumption 8 – Normality of Errors 
 
The normality assumption is fundamental to hypothesis testing. To test for this assumption, 
Jarque-Bera´s test for normality, which is one of the most commonly applied tests, could be 
used. (Brooks, 2003, p 178) A normal distribution should be symmetric about its mean, i.e. 
not skewed, and have a coefficient of kurtosis of three (ibid). Despite the fact that most 
econometric techniques assume that the data is normally distributed, most of the financial data 
is not (ibid, p 3). However, sample sizes that are sufficiently large will follow the appropriate 
distributions anyway, even in the absence of error normality (ibid, p 182). 
 
If assumption two to eight holds, the error terms are referred to as well-behaved or white 
noise errors (Ramanathan, 1998, p 104). 
 
 
 
                                                
22
 According to Westerlund (2005, p 181) White’s test is a more general test and can be used to find all sorts of 
heteroscedasticity, compared to Goldfeld-Quant`s test which can only be used to find proportional 
heteroscedasticity. 
23
 Most standard econometrics packages have an option that allows the user to employ standard error estimates, 
which have been modified to account for the heteroscedasticity (Brooks, 2003, p 152). 
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Assumption 9 – Multicollinearity  
 
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between each individual variable’s contributions to the 
overall fit of the regression, with the result that the regression has a very high R2 even if the 
individual variables are not significant24. This is called multicollinearity and occurs when the 
independent variables are very highly correlated with each other. Another problem when 
multicollinearity is present is that adding or removing independent variables leads to large 
changes in the coefficient values or significances of the other variables. One method to detect 
the presence of multicollinearity in a regression is simply to look at the matrix of correlations 
between the variables, where a high correlation between two variables indicate 
multicollinearity25. (Brooks, 2003, p 190-192)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24
 R2 measures how well the independent variables explain variations in the dependent variable (Brooks, 2003, p 
133). 
25
 According to Brooks (2003, p 191) a correlation of 0.8, or higher, indicates that multicollinearity is present in 
the data. 
 15 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this chapter we present the theoretical frame of reference, which underlie our analysis. We 
begin with a discussion about the concept of corporate governance, which is followed by 
relevant theory and previous research within the subject area.   
 
3.1 Corporate Governance and Legislations  
 
Corporate governance is about govern companies in such a way that they fulfil owners 
demand for return on invested capital, and by that contributes to the efficiency and growth in 
society (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004). A proper governance framework is 
of fundamental importance in strengthening the performance of economies and to discourage 
mismanagement and fraud (ECGI, 2005).  
 
 
“Corporate governance is the basis of accountability in companies, institutions and 
enterprises, balancing corporate economic and social goals on the one hand with community 
and individual aspirations on the other”   
 (ECGI, 2005) 
 
 
Today’s concept of corporate governance emerged in the United States in the mid-1980s as a 
reaction by some institutional owners to self-serving company managers. It took until the 
early 1990s, when a number of high profile scandals become public, for the concept to gain 
widespread attention in Europe. Since then the concept has developed rapidly and today the 
term corporate governance is familiar to most people. (Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2004) According to an article in CA Magazine (2005) the main reasons for the 
increasing importance regarding corporate governance is that governments and regulatory 
bodies have introduced new rules, and that corporate governance is a main criterion when 
financial analyst evaluates companies. It is thus common that media rank companies 
according to governance quality (ibid). 
 
The rules, or so called codes for corporate governance, embody what good governance is 
about and today about 50 countries have their own codes, with varying degrees of freedom 
(Coombes & Wong, 2004; Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004). Some countries, 
such as the U.K., have had a quite fast acceptance and improvement of the code for corporate 
governance. However, even in countries with rather slow progress, the existence of such 
codes has at least put corporate governance in the public domain and increased managers and 
director’s awareness regarding what is expected of them. (Coombes & Wong, 2004) 
International bodies such as the European Union has drawn up guidelines for corporate 
governance and in 2002 the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) was founded to 
improve corporate governance by encourage independent scientific research and related 
activities (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004; ECGI, 2005).  
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3.2 Different Corporate Governance Systems  
 
Scott (1985), De Jong (1989) and Weimer & Pape (1999), among others, have classified the 
relatively rich and industrialized countries, for which a corporate governance system can be 
identified, into four different types of corporate governance systems; the Anglo-Saxon system 
(e.g. U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia), the Germanic system (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland), the Latin system (e.g. Italy, France, Spain, 
Belgium) and the Japanese system (which is considered an isolate). According to Weimer & 
Pape (1999) the corporate governance system differs between the four groups by the means of 
board system, ownership structure, concept of the firm, importance of stock market, among 
other factors. As mentioned above, Sweden belongs to the Germanic system and in contrast to 
the Anglo-Saxon model, that has come to dominate international developments within 
corporate governance, it is common for one or a few major owners to dominate ownership in 
Swedish companies. In Sweden, the same person cannot be the managing director and the 
chair of the board, why Swedish companies normally are composed exclusively of non-
executive directors. (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004) Corporations in the 
Germanic system are also considered as autonomous economic entities, striving for the 
continuity of the firm as a whole, rather than as a device to create shareholder value, as is the 
case in Anglo-Saxon countries (Moerland, 1995a). Furthermore, stock markets play a less 
important role in the economy of the Germanic countries and an active external market for 
corporate control is almost non-existent (Weimer et al, 1999).  
 
Due to the differences between the corporate governance systems, no unified corporate 
governance code, directed to all countries, exist. Instead, many countries have developed 
different individual corporate governance recommendations, with the purpose of improving 
each countries unique corporate governance system, such as the Securities Act (USA, 1933), 
the Securities Exchange Act (USA, 1934), the Council of Competitiveness` Report (USA, 
1992), the Cadbury Report (U.K., 1993), the Japanese Commercial Code (Japan, 1993), the 
Viénot Report (France, 1996), the Peters Report (the Netherlands, 1998), the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (USA, 2002) (Weimer et al, 1999; Toda & McCarty, 2005; Ogden et al, 2003, p 125). In 
Sweden, the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance was developed in 2004.  
 
3.3 Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 
 
Public confidence in the business community is of fundamental importance to both the 
economy and the willingness to invest, because it affects company’s ability to attract capital. 
In the long run it also affects people’s employment opportunities, savings and pensions. A 
majority of the Swedish inhabitants are shareholders, direct or indirect, and are hence 
influenced by the way stock market companies are managed. In recent years, Sweden, as 
many other countries, has been affected by a number of corporate scandals (e.g. Skandia), 
which has attracted great attention and caused much criticism. (Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2004) 
 
The first collected code for corporate governance, aimed at stock market companies, with a 
chance of gaining wide support in the Swedish industry was presented in year 2004. The code 
is called the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance and is based on the Swedish Companies 
Act (Aktiebolagslagen, 1975:1385), listing requirements on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, 
recommendations from the Swedish Industry and Commerce Stock Exchange Committee, and 
the Swedish tradition of self regulation. The mandate of this code does not allow it to 
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prescribe which companies that should apply to the code and as a result the code is drawn up 
so that it is broadly applicable to different types of companies. According to the Code Group, 
the group responsible for the development of the code, corporate governance is most needed 
for companies with a diverse group of shareholders, who cannot be expected to posses the 
same expertise and resources that major shareholders have. (Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2004) 
 
The overall aim of the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance is to improve the management 
of Swedish corporations, and hopefully it will lead to increased effectiveness, competitiveness 
and facilitate confidence in the Swedish capital market. The code is based on the principle 
“comply or complain”, introduced by the Cadbury Committee in the U.K. in 1992, which is 
commonly used in corporate governance codes. This means that it is possible for companies 
to diverge from individual rules, as long as a reason for the divergence is stated. The rules in 
the code are designed to provide guidance to companies, and for publicly listed companies it 
is up to the board of directors to decide when a justification of a divergence is needed. 
However, in the end it is the market who decides whether the declaration is needed and if it is 
acceptable. (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004) 
 
The Swedish Association of Exchange Listed Companies and the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
have agreed to incorporate the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance into the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange's rules. The code will thus apply to all Swedish companies on the A-, as well 
as the O-list, with a market capitalization exceeding three billion Swedish kronor, measured 
annually in May 31. In the future, the code will cover all listed companies, but the smaller 
companies are being given time to adapt. (OMX, 2005) 
 
3.3.1 Board Composition According to the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance 
 
According to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2004) the board of directors should 
manage the company in such a way that the owner’s interest is being met in the best possible 
way. The board is also responsible for deciding the managing director’s compensation and 
other terms of employment and for evaluating the work of the managing director on regular 
basis. Thus, the composition of the board should enable it to take advantage of the 
qualifications and experience that is needed to meet the independence criteria required to 
manage the company effectively and independent, and when the board is renewed the 
development of the companies operations as well as the need for continuity should be taken 
into considerations (ibid). The recommendations in the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance should serve as guidelines for companies, the nomination committee26 and the 
shareholders in the process of appointing the board of directors.  
 
For example, the board should have an equal gender distribution as well as exhibiting 
diversity and breadth in the director’s qualifications, experience and background. The 
directors are also obligated to devote the time and care required to handle the interest of the 
company and the owners in the best possible way and they should therefore not have too 
many other duties at the same time. (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004) 
                                                
26
 The nomination committee make recommendations for the chair and other members of the board, as well as 
recommendations for the division of board fees and on remuneration for committee work (Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2004). 
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Also, the board should not exceed the size that allows it to use simple and effective working 
methods, nor should the board members be appointed for more than one year at a time and 
maximum one member from the senior management team should be a board member. The 
majority of the directors elected by the shareholders meeting should be independent of the 
company and its management27. (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 2004) 
 
3.4 Principal-Agent Theory 
 
According to theory it is the shareholders, being the owner of the firm, that have the control 
over the firm’s activities. In practice, large modern firms have a diffuse and fragmented group 
of shareholders, why it is almost impossible for the shareholders to collectively make the 
daily decisions needed to operate the business, and it is common that the control of the firm 
lies in the hand of the directors. (Arnold, 2002, p 16; Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p 4) The 
change in ownership structure has hence lead to a separation of corporate ownership and 
control, with ownership concentrated in one group, the shareholders, whereas the control of 
the firm is concentrated to a separate group, the management team (Ogden et al, 2003, p 75).  
 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976) the relationship between the stockholders and the 
management represent a pure agency relationship, where the stockholders are the principals 
and the managers, that the principals hire to run the company, are the agents. The agency 
relationship can be described as a contract where one or more persons, the principals, engage 
another person, the agent, to perform some services on their behalf, which involves delegating 
decision making power to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
If both parties, the principal and the agent, are utility maximizers there is a risk that the agent 
will not act in the best interest of the principal. The problem of securing that an agent behave 
in a way that maximize the principals welfare is quite general and exists in all organizations 
and at every level of management. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) The principal-agency problem 
is not a new phenomenon, but was discussed already in 1932 by Berle and Means. Over the 
years the principal-agent theory has gained increased attention, and studies by Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) among others, has contributed with more profound knowledge about the 
problem.    
 
When the principal and the agent have goals that differ from each other it leads to a conflict. It 
is possible for the principal to limit divergences from his interest by monitoring and 
controlling the activities of the agent. This can be done by using formal control systems, 
budget restrictions or by introducing special contract clauses. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) It is 
generally impossible for the principal, at zero cost, to ensure that the agent will make optimal 
decisions, from the principal’s viewpoint, and in most agency relationships the principal and 
the agent will incur bonding and monitoring costs. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) However, 
these costs are in some cases so high that it is not profitable to monitor and control the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Arnold, 2002, p 826).  
   
Another problem occurs when the principal and the agent differs in their willingness to accept 
project because of different opinions regarding risk taking (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is thus 
common to try to solve the problem by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent 
                                                
27
 Se Appendix C for Size and composition of the board according to the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance. 
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(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the incentive solution the wealth of the executive is tided to 
the wealth of the shareholders in order to align the executive’s interest with shareholders 
desires. Aligning interest in this way is commonly done by giving executives stock, stock 
options, or both as an essential part of their compensation. (Barnea, Haugen & Senbet, 1980; 
Haugen & Senbet 1981; Kim & Nofsinger, 2004). According to Hörnberg & Rapp (2002, p 
58) a disadvantage with stock options is that they do not always measure performance. 
However this problem can, at least partly, be solved by designing the stock option program in 
such a way that they only pay of when the firm’s stock beat an industry index (ibid).  
 
3.5 Previous Research 
 
Most of the research, that examines the board of directors effectiveness, have focused on firm 
value or firm performance as a measure of effectiveness (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1993; Yermack, 1996; Oxelheim & Randøy 2003; Ho & Williams, 2003; Carter, Simkins & 
Simpson, 2003; among others). Especially the existence of inside versus outside directors 
have been extensively studied, where evidence suggests that outside directors provide a more 
objective view than inside directors (e.g. Fama, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981; Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
outside directors benefit shareholders in decisions related to tender offers and management 
buyouts (Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan & Davidson, 1999, respectively) 
and that the incidence of fraud is less when there are more outside directors (Beasley, 1996). 
However, alternative evidence suggest that number of outside directors is not related to the 
firm’s long-term performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Klein, 1998; Bhagat & Black, 
1997;1999) or firm value (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
 
Board size and effectiveness has also been the subject of numerous studies, where Steiner 
(1972) and Hackman (1990) found that large groups are more difficult to coordinate, 
Yermack (1996) and Huther (1996) provides evidence that firm value and board size are 
inversely related, and Jensen (1993) suggests that boards with more than eight members are 
too big. On the opposite, Baysinger & Butler (1985) suggests that large boards have more 
diverse skills, which are useful in the dealings of the various functions that a board must 
fulfil. Zahra & Pearce (1989) also suggest that a larger board enhances information-
processing capabilities and the quality of advice given to corporate management.  
 
A subject of less extensive research is multiple directorships and CEO duality. However, 
Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that multiple directorships can be valuable because they add to 
the director’s experience and knowledge base. Both Shivdasani (1993) and Talmor & Wallace 
(2000) provide empirical support for a relationship between number of directorships and CEO 
compensation, while Core et al (1999) found the opposite. Jensen (1993) suggests that board 
monitoring decreases if the CEO is also the chair of the board, which is supported by Beatty 
& Zajak (1994). On the other hand, Kesner, Victor & Lamont (1986) found no evidence of a 
CEO duality effect.  
 
Whether board effectiveness is related to board diversity has also been the subject of 
numerous studies. Carter et al (2003) found a positive relationship between the fraction of 
both women and minorities on the board and firm value. Another study on board diversity, 
performed by Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader (2003), presented evidence of a positive relationship 
between demographic board diversity and a firm’s financial performance, while Biggins 
(1999) suggest that board diversity and shareholder return is positively related. Singh, 
Vinnicombe & Johnson (2001) found that many of the largest and most profitable firms on the 
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“U.K. FTSE 100” had female directors on their boards. However, Shrader Blackburn & Iles 
(1997) and Durante et al (2005) found no relationship between the number of female directors 
and firm performance, measured by return on equity and return on assets, and firm value, 
respectively. Consistent with those findings, Becker et al (2005), who studied board diversity 
and its connection to the company’s stock price, did not found that diversified boards 
contributes to firm performance. 
 
Few studies have focused on the relationship between CEO compensation and ownership 
structure. However, Allen (1981) found that CEO compensation and the amount of equity 
held by the CEO are negatively related, while Holderness & Sheehan (1988) provide evidence 
that those managers who are majority shareholders receive higher compensation than other 
managers. In contrast to this, Lambert, Larcker & Weigelt (1993) found that CEO 
compensation is a decreasing function of the CEOs ownership.  
 
There have also been few studies examining the effects of board characteristics on CEO 
compensation. Some of the earlier studies looked at the relationship between outside directors 
and CEO compensation, where Finkelstein & Hambrick (1989) found no relationship, as 
opposite to Lambert et al (1993) and Boyd (1994), who both found a positive relationship. 
Lambert et al (1993) also found that CEO compensation is higher when the CEO has 
appointed a greater proportion of the directors, while Hallock (1997) showed that CEO 
compensation is higher in firms with interlocked28 outside directors. Furthermore, 
Andjelkovic, Boyle & McNoe (2002) found no evidence of a relationship between pay and 
performance, regardless of board structure.  
 
Some of the more recent studies are Cyert et al, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Talmor & Wallace, 
2000; Cahan et al, 2005, who all studied the relationship between board structure and CEO 
compensation.  
 
Cahan et al (2005) studied 80 New Zealand public sector companies by testing how variables 
related to board composition, such as board size, CEO duality, director quality, number of 
directorships and number of inside and grey directors affected CEO compensation. In addition 
to this they also included a number of control variables related to managerial discretion and 
task complexity (e.g. firm size), firm performance (return on assets) and ownership structure. 
They found that board size, whether the CEO sits on the board and director quality have 
impact on CEO pay. They also found that the board variables had the second highest 
incremental explanatory power, after variables related to managerial discretion and task 
complexity. Thus, they conclude that board structure does affect CEO compensation in New 
Zealand public sector companies, although not as much as managerial discretion and task 
complexity.   
 
Talmor & Wallace (2000) studied the relationship between board structure and CEO 
compensation in 160 U.S. financial institutions, where they tested for firm performance and 
managerial discretion. While they found that CEO compensation is related to the percentage 
of insiders, percentage of multiple directorships and the presence of outside blockholder 
representation on the board, they found no significant relationship between board size and 
CEO compensation. They also found that the board variables had the second highest amount 
of incremental explanatory power, while variables that proxy for managerial discretion and 
task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. 
                                                
28
 A director is interlocked if an inside officer of the firm serves on the board of that outside directors company 
(Core et al, 1999). 
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By studying the relationship in 495 publicly traded U.S. firms over a three year period, Core 
et al (1999) found that all of their board structure variables (board size, percentage of inside 
directors, percentage of outside directors appointed by the CEO, percentage of interlocked 
outside directors, grey outside directors, outside directors over age 69, multiple directorships, 
CEO duality), except percentage of interlocked outside directors, where significantly related 
to CEO compensation. Overall, their result suggests that CEOs in firms with weaker 
governance structure receives greater compensation.  
 
Cyert et al (1997) studied the determinants of the level of CEO compensation, focusing on the 
role of the governance characteristics of the board of directors, in 1 671 large and small 
publicly traded U.S. firms. Their overall findings show that board composition plays a 
significant role in the determination of CEO compensation. In particular, they found that CEO 
compensation is decreasing with the board of director’s ownership, ownership of the largest 
shareholder, probability of bankruptcy, while it increases with CEOs ownership, the tenure of 
the CEO and the percentage of outside directors on the board. However, they found little 
evidence that a larger board size contributes to an overcompensation of the CEO, while the 
CEO compensation is higher if the CEO also holds the board chairmanship. Their results also 
hold after controlling for other important determinants of CEO compensation, such as firm 
size and market and accounting based performance measures. 
 
3.5.1 Swedish Studies 
 
As mentioned earlier, no studies examining the relationship between board structure and CEO 
compensation, has been done in Sweden. However, a few studies have investigated how 
different aspects of board structure affect firm value.  
 
Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) studied the effect of foreign Anglo-American board membership 
on firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, with a sample of 650 firm-year observations for 
traded companies with headquarters in Sweden or Norway, of which 296 refer to Sweden. 
Their result indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider Anglo-American 
board members, after a variety of firm-specific and corporate governance related factors have 
been controlled for. Their study also indicates that the positive effect of an appointment of an 
outside Anglo-American board member appears to be stronger in larger and older firms.  
 
Ho & Williams (2003) investigated the link between corporate board features and corporate 
performance for a sample of 286 publicly traded firms from South Africa, Sweden and U.K., 
of which 94 refer to Sweden. Firm performance is in their study, in contrast to many other 
studies, defined as the efficiency of value added rather than in financial terms. Their empirical 
findings fail to show any unconditional link between board features and corporate 
performance across any of the three nations included in their study, and finds no evidence that 
specific board features are associated with corporate performance.  
 
Durante et al (2005) and Becker et al (2005) have both studied the potential impact a 
diversified board has on firm value and corporate performance, respectively. Durante et al 
(2005) focused on the relationship between female directors and firm value measured by 
Tobins Q, for 97 publicly traded Swedish firms, and found no significant evidence of such a 
relationship. However, their result indicates a positive relationship between firm size and 
number of employees to the number of female directors. Becker et al (2005) focused on the 
relationship between a diversified board and corporate performance for 53 publicly traded 
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Swedish firms. In their study, the diversification of the board is defined by sex, age, 
nationality, education and independence of the directors. In contrast to earlier research, 
Becker et al (2005), in addition to their data analysis, carried out interviews with four 
directors, one member of a nomination committee and one analyst. According to their data 
analysis, diversification does not have a positive effect on firm performance, while their result 
based on the interviews predominantly promotes an increased diversification among board 
members.  
 
Levin (2005) studied board structure and the functions of boards of 15 Swedish social 
enterprises, where a social enterprise is defined as a company which is founded with the 
purpose of creating jobs or a workplace, a meaning in life or enhance further integration. 
According to Levin (2005) there might be a connection between the founders of a social 
enterprise and the board composition, since a significant number of companies founded by 
users choose, what Levin (2005) calls, a classical co-operative board. 
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4. Development of Hypotheses and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The variables of the cross-sectional regression are presented, hypotheses for each 
independent variable are developed and a summary of the statistics for CEO compensation 
and all independent variables is presented.   
 
4.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in our regression is the total CEO compensation, measured in SEK, 
which consists of base salary, annual bonus29 and other remunerations30, and it is labelled 
ceocomp. The value of any stock options is not included in the CEO compensation, since it is 
a complex task to determine the right value of such a program31 (Core et al, 1999).  
 
4.2 Independent Variables 
 
In our regression analysis we include ten independent variables, out of which five are control 
variables. The independent variables are classified into four categories; board composition, 
managerial discretion and task complexity, firm performance and ownership. We base our 
classification on Cyert et al, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Talmor & Wallace, 2000 and Cahan et al, 
2005, who all studied the board composition influence on CEO compensation32. A summary 
of the independent variables, their expected signs and units of measurement is found in Table 
4.1. 
4.2.1 Board Composition  
 
We include five independent variables regarding the firm’s board composition; board size, 
CEO on board, busy directors, tenure of the directors and female directors33. 
 
 
Board Size 
 
Several studies show that firms with many directors are less effective, indicated by a lower 
market value (e.g. Huther, 1996; Yermack, 1996) and a more seldom response in the absence 
of a crisis (e.g. Jensen, 1993). According to Kim & Nofsinger (2004, p 38) some boards are 
too big for all directors to be actively involved, leading many directors to conveniently 
believe that others are doing the monitoring job. According to Vafeas (2000) a reduction in 
board size is an effective technique in attaining better monitoring. According to the Swedish 
Code of Corporate Governance (2004) a board should consist of a sufficient number of 
                                                
29
 Annual bonus is the bonus for performance in 2004, paid out in 2005.  
30
 Other remunerations include financial benefits such as; free car and house, compensation for moving 
expenditures and free lunch. 
31
 Since there are many different ways to calculate the value of stock options, the reliability would probably be 
negatively affected if we included these in our study. 
32
 In order to examine the relative explanatory power of the different classes of independent variables, Talmor & 
Wallace (2000) and Cahan et al (2005) both computed the adjusted R2 for the different categories individually. 
33
 Core et al (1999) and Cahan et al (2005) among others, also include variables to capture the percentage of 
independent and dependent directors. Since the time effort associated with the gathering of this information is 
beyond the scope of this study, we chose not to include any such variables. See 3.3.1 Board composition 
according to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance and 3.5 Previous research. 
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directors that enables an easy and efficient work. However, they do not give any suggestions 
about how many directors that is. Consistent with Cyert et al (1997), Core et al (1999) and 
Cahan et al (2005) we include board size, labelled bdsize, as a board variable. Both previous 
studies and theory indicates that large boards in general are less efficient, and we believe a 
less efficient board could lead to higher CEO compensation. Thus, we expect a positive 
relationship between board size and CEO compensation and our first hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
H10 : There is no relationship between bdsize and ceocomp 
H1A: There is a positive relationship between bdsize and ceocomp 
 
 
CEO on the Board (dummy) 
 
Yermack (1996) suggests that the agency problem34 is more serious when the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, and according to Core et al (1999) activist shareholders have thus 
argued for a separation of the CEO position and the board chair. Also Jensen (1993) argues 
for a separation of these two positions. When collecting the information for our study, we 
found that it is very rare that the CEO is also the chairman of the board within companies 
listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. According to the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance (2004), only one person from the senior management group is allowed to be a 
member of the board35. However, since board duality36, according to Beatty & Zajak (1994), 
can be an important factor within a board, we follow Cahan et als (2005) example and modify 
this variable. We thus include a dummy variable, which represents whether the CEO is a 
member of the board or not. We label the variable ceoobd and code it 1 if the CEO is on the 
board, and 0 otherwise. Since the CEO, in general, is assumed to lobby for a higher personal 
compensation and due to the fact that board duality leads to more influence on board 
decisions and that board members may be less objective and critical when the CEO is on the 
board (Boyd, 1994), we expect a positive relationship between CEO on board and CEO 
compensation. Our second hypothesis is then: 
 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
H20 : There is no relationship between ceoobd and ceocomp 
H2A: There is a positive relationship between ceoobd and ceocomp 
 
 
Busy Directors  
 
Today many directors serve on multiple boards, which lead some directors to be overextended 
and not being able to provide the time and expertise required (Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p 37). 
According to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2004) a director of the board 
should not hold more directorships than he/she can manage. We include the variable busy as a 
measurement of the percentage of directors who serves on three or more boards, which is 
consistent with several other studies (e.g. Core et al, 1999; Talmor & Wallace, 2000; Cahan et 
al, 2005). Because too many directorships are assumed to reduce the director’s effectiveness, 
we expect a positive relationship between busy directors and CEO compensation. 
Consequently, our third hypothesis is:  
 
                                                
34
 See 3.4 Principal-agent theory. 
35
 See 3.3.1 Board composition according to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance.  
36
 Board duality occurs when the CEO is also a director of the board (Beatty & Zajak, 1994). 
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Hypothesis 3. 
 
H30 : There is no relationship between busy and ceocomp 
H3A: There is a positive relationship between busy and ceocomp 
 
 
Tenure of the Directors  
 
One way to increase the effectiveness of the board is to reduce the tenure of the director 
(Ogden et al, 2003). According to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2004) the 
directors of the board should be renewed continuously in order to keep up with the 
development of the firm’s activity, and the directors should only be elected for one year in a 
row. In order to check whether tenure has any explanatory value for CEO compensation we 
measure the percentage of the directors that have served on the board for more than five years. 
We label this variable as tenure and expect a positive relationship between tenure and CEO 
compensation, since increased tenure could be a sign of less effective boards (Ogden et al, 
2003). Our fourth hypothesis is then: 
 
Hypothesis 4. 
 
H40 : There is no relationship between tenure and ceocomp 
H4A: There is a positive relationship between tenure and ceocomp 
 
 
Female directors 
 
A diversified board has a broader competence and the opportunity to solve problems on the 
basis of different perspectives, and is thus better at generating a positive return for 
shareholders (Biggins, 1999). According to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 
(2004), every board should strive for an equal distribution in terms of sex. Recent studies have 
shown a positive relationship between female directors and firm value and firm performance 
(e.g. Singh, Vinnicombe & Johnson, 2001; Carter et al, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 
2003). Inconsistent with those findings, a Swedish study by Durante et al (2005)37 found no 
relationship between female directors and firm value within Swedish firms38. Since a more 
diversified board is supposed to be better at monitoring, we include the variable female and, 
despite the findings of Durante et al (2005), expect a negative relationship between female 
directors and CEO compensation. We define female as the percentage of women that serves 
on the board, and our fifth hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 5. 
 
H50 : There is no relationship between female and ceocomp 
H5A: There is a negative relationship between female and ceocomp 
 
4.2.2 Managerial Discretion and Task Complexity 
 
As control variable for managerial discretion and task complexity we use two variables; firm 
size and number of employees. 
 
 
 
                                                
37
 See 3.5 Previous research. 
38
 The relatively small sample size of 97 firms may explain why they did not find a significant relationship. 
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Firm Size 
 
One way for a manager to increase his/her compensation is to engage in empire building39, 
since CEO compensation is highly correlated with the size of the firm (Ogden et al, 2003, p 
86). This is consistent with earlier studies, who suggest that firm size is a determinant for 
CEO compensation (e.g. Rosen, 1981;1982; among others). Talmor & Wallace (2000) and 
Cahan et al (2005) further suggest that large firm size indicates that managers have more and 
larger decisions to make, thus a higher task complexity and consequently higher managerial 
discretion. Similar to Talmor & Wallace (2000) and Cahan et al (2005) we thus use firm size, 
labelled as fsize, as a dependent variable. We define the variable as the firm’s total assets and, 
since firm size is supposed to be correlated with CEO compensation, we expect a positive 
relation between firm size and CEO compensation. Thus, our sixth hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 6 
 
H60 : There is no relationship between fsize and ceocomp 
H6A: There is a positive relationship between fsize and ceocomp 
 
 
Number of Employees 
 
Another measure of managerial discretion and task complexity, used by Simunic (1980) and 
Cahan et al (2005), is decentralization and diversification of the firm. To measure this they 
use number of subsidiaries and number of industry segments that the firm operates in. Since 
this information is not always presented in a clear and legible way in the annual report, we 
have chosen not to include them in our study40. Instead we use the number of employees as an 
additional measure of managerial discretion and task complexity, since it is argued that it is 
more difficult to monitor management in firms with many employees (Eaton & Rosen, 1983). 
We label this variable as employ, and expect a positive relationship between number of 
employees and CEO compensation. Our seventh hypothesis is then: 
 
Hypothesis 7. 
 
H70 : There is no relationship between employ and ceocomp 
H7A: There is a positive relationship between employ and ceocomp 
 
4.2.3 Firm Performance 
 
As control variable for firm performance we use the firms return on assets, in order to 
determine whether firm performance is an explanatory determinant for CEO compensation41.  
 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Managers often have an incentive to manipulate earnings upwards, in order to receive a higher 
compensation, since it is common that CEO compensation includes annual bonuses based on 
                                                
39
 Empire building occurs when managers are maximizing the size of the firm, rather than its value (Ogden et al, 
2003, p 86). 
40
 We choose not to include decentralization and diversification of the firm, due to the fear of reducing the 
reliability of our study. 
41
 Core et al (1999), among others, also include market-based measures, such as stock return (RET) as a firm 
performance variable. Since we do not include stock options in the CEO total compensation, we omit these 
market-based variables from our study. 
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the firm’s performance for the year (Ogden et al, 2003, p 84). Many studies have found a 
significant positive relationship between a firms accounting rate of return and CEO 
compensation (e.g. Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Sloan, 1993; Joskow & Rose, 1994; Core et 
al, 1999; Cahan et al, 2005). Similar to Cahan et al (2005), among others, we thus include the 
firm’s return on assets as a variable. We label it roa and expect a positive relationship 
between return on assets and CEO compensation, with our eight hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 8. 
 
H80 : There is no relationship between roa and ceocomp 
H8A: There is a positive relationship between roa and ceocomp 
 
4.2.4 Ownership Structure 
 
The last two control variables, foreign ownership and option program, are used to determine 
whether the firms ownership structure affects CEO compensation. According to Cyert et al 
(1997) and Core et al (1999) ownership structure is an important determinant in explaining 
CEO compensation, since ownership structure affects the incentive of the owners to monitor 
the manager’s performance. 
 
 
Foreign Ownership (dummy) 
 
In Sweden, a shareholder who owns more than ten percent of a firm’s outstanding shares, a so 
called corner, can thwart a takeover42 (Finansportalen, 2005). Furthermore, a block holder 
with more than ten percent of the firm’s outstanding shares can demand an extra shareholder 
meeting, and thus offer oneself as a candidate for the board. Due to the high proportion of 
ownership, the probability that such a large block holder will be elected to the board is quite 
high.  
 
According to Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) foreign board membership is an essential part of a 
corporate governance structure that determines the firm value, where especially Anglo-
American board membership has a significantly positive impact on Swedish firms43. Thus, if a 
foreign owner owns more than ten percent, and becomes a board member, it could affect the 
firm’s corporate governance structure. According to Biggins (1999) and Erhardt et al (2003), 
a diversified board is positively related to a higher return for shareholders and firm value, 
respectively. 
 
However, since the information about each director’s nationality and whether the block 
holders are insiders or outsiders are not always presented in the annual report, it is very 
difficult to determine whether their is any relationship between the existence of large block 
holders and CEO compensation. If the board is packed with CEO cronies44 the possibility for 
higher CEO compensation increases, while it probably decreases if the block holder 
represents an institutional owner45 (Ogden et al, 2003, p 88). 
                                                
42
 More than 90 percent is demanded in order to conduct a forced coercion (Finansportalen, 2005). 
43
 See 3.5 Previous research. 
44
 CEO cronies are insiders with a bias toward management (Ogden, 2003, p 88). 
45
 Such as Sjätte AP:fonden, among others. 
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To measure if foreign owners affects the CEO compensation we thus, similar to Oxelheim & 
Randøy (2003)46, include a dummy variable that measures whether any of the large block 
holders, who owns more than ten percent, are foreign owners47. Since we have not been able 
to break this down by home country, foreign owners is represented by all nationalities outside 
Sweden. According to Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001) as much as 67.2 percent of all Swedish 
shares held by foreigners in 1997 were held by U.S. or U.K. investors. We label this variable 
as foreign and code it as 1 if there exist one or more foreign block holders that own ten 
percent or more, and 0 otherwise. Since CEO compensation, in general, is higher outside of 
Sweden and especially in U.S. and U.K. (Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p 18) we expect a positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and CEO compensation. Our ninth hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 9. 
 
H90 : There is no relationship between foreign and ceocomp 
H9A: There is a positive relationship between foreign and ceocomp 
 
 
Stock Options (dummy) 
 
One solution to the agency problem48 is to tie the CEO wealth to the wealth of the 
shareholders, so that everyone shares the same goal (Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p 11). This can 
be done by issuing stock options as a significant component of the CEO compensation (ibid), 
and according to a study by Mehran (1995) firm performance is positively related to equity-
based CEO compensation. However, as mentioned earlier it is often quite problematic to 
determine the right value of such stock options (Core et al, 1999). In order to measure 
whether the presence of stock options has explanatory value for CEO compensation, we 
include a dummy variable, labelled option. We code it 1 if there is any stock options49 aimed 
at the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Since stock options is a part of the CEO total compensation, we 
expect that the existence of stock options reduces the total CEO compensation. Thus, we 
expect a negative relation between CEO stock options and CEO compensation with the tenth 
hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 10. 
 
H100 : There is no relationship between option and ceocomp 
H10A: There is a negative relationship between option and ceocomp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
46
 Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) measured the percentage of equity held by foreign citizens or institutions in 
relation to the total equity of the firm. 
47
 This information is available in the annual report. 
48
 See 3.4 Principal-agent theory. 
49
 When determining whether any stock options were present, we used the search word: option program, 
incentive program, incentive, option, financial instruments when searching in the annual report. 
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Table 4.1 Independent variables, their expected signs and units of measurement 
 
Variable Variable name Expected sign Unit of measurement 
Board size bdsize + Number of board directors 
CEO on the board ceoobd + Dummy, 0 or 1 
Busy director busy + Percent of busy directors 
Tenure of the director tenure + Percent of tenure directors 
Female directors female - Percent of female directors 
Firm size fsize + Total assets, MSEK 
Employees employ + Number of employees 
Return on assets roa + Percent of return on assets 
Foreign ownership foreign + Dummy, 0 or 1 
CEO stock options option - Dummy, 0 or 1 
 
 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In Table 4.2 we present the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
used in our study.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for CEO compensation and independent variables* 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
ceocomp  3 720 767 2 458 000 3 728 387 300 000 31 137 580 
Board composition      
bdsize 7.56 7.00 2.25 3.00 14.00 
ceoobd 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
busy 0.50 0.50 0.22 0.00 1.00 
tenure 0.35 0.38 0.25 0.00 1.00 
female 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.50 
Discretion and complexity      
fsize  34 200 1 080 196 000 18 2 520 000 
employ 5 662 468 18 035 1 206 153 
Firm performance      
Roa 0.02 0.06 0.20 -1.58 0.48 
Ownership structure      
foreign 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
option 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
*See section 4.1 and 4.2 for variable definitions 
and table 4.1 for units of measurement     
 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
 
The highest CEO compensation during 2004 is 31.14 MSEK, paid to the CEO at Nokia, while 
the lowest CEO compensation is only 0.30 MSEK, paid to the CEO at Addnode. The average 
CEO compensation is 3.72 MSEK, which differs largely from the 9.35 MSEK, 8.32 MSEK 
and 0.80 MSEK50 reported by Cyert et al (1997), Core et al (1999) and Cahan et al (2005), 
                                                
50
 Using conversion rate for 1999 and 1997, respectively.  
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respectively. The median is as low as 2.46 MSEK, which indicates that our study will 
examine a different CEO compensation range than prior research. 
 
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
The average (median) number of directors serving on a board is 7.56 (7.00). The largest 
boards consist of 14.00 directors, while the smallest boards only have 3.00 directors. The 
CEO is a member of the board in 61 percent of the cases, 50 percent of the directors serve on 
more than three other boards and 35 percent has been a member of the board for five years or 
more. According to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2004) every board should 
aim for an equal sex distribution, why it is interestingly to notice that only 14 percent of the 
board members are women51. Worth mentioning is also that the highest percent of women 
serving on a single board is 50 percent, while some boards do not have any female directors at 
all.  
 
There is a considerable diversity in firm size and number of employees between the firms 
included in our study. The largest firm, measured by firm size as a function of total assets, is 
Nordea with total assets of 2 520 000 MSEK, while Sign On is the smallest firm with total 
assets of 18 MSEK. The average (median) firm size is 34 200 (1 080) MSEK, which is 
considerably less than the 721 248 MSEK reported by Cahan et al (2005) and the 380 774 
MSEK reported by Talmor & Wallace (2000). Securitas is the firm that has the largest 
number of employees, 206 153, while Luxonen is the firm with the fewest employees, one. 
The average (median) number of employees is 5 662 (468). The fact that the averaged value is 
so much higher than the median value, for both firm size and number of employees, indicate 
the presence of some large observations in the data. On average, the firms in our study earn a 
return on assets of two percent, compared to seven percent (Cahan et al, 2005) and eleven 
percent (Core et al, 1999). HQ Fonder is the firm that has the highest return on assets, 48 
percent, while Digital Vision has the lowest, -158 percent. 
 
Table 4.2 also shows that, on average, 24 percent of the firms have one or more foreign owner 
holding more than ten percent of the voting rights and that 51 percent of the CEOs are 
compensated by stock options.  
 
4.4.3 Correlation Coefficients  
 
Table 4.3 provides the correlation coefficients between the independent variables in our study. 
The highest correlation is between bdsize and employ, which could indicate that large firms 
with high managerial discretion and task complexity thrive for more directors since they are 
more difficult to monitor. This is also consistent with the relatively high correlation between 
bdsize and fsize. More interestingly, bdsize and female seems to be related, which suggests 
that women are more represented in larger boards. Furthermore, it is more likely that the CEO 
is a board member if the board is large, indicated by the correlation between bdsize and 
ceoobd. However, whether the CEO is compensated with stock options seems to be unrelated 
to whether the CEO is a member of the board.  
                                                
51
 Durante et al (2005) found that 17 percent of the directors in 2004 were women. However, they only studied 
97 companies on the Swedish A- and O-list.  
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Interestingly, the correlation between employ and fsize is relatively low, indicating that 
number of employees is not a proxy for firm size, or the other way around. Thus, a large firm, 
measured by total assets, does not necessarily have to have many employees.   
 
 
Table 4.3 Correlation Coefficients Between the Independent Variables* 
 
  bdsize ceoobd busy tenure female fsize employ roa foreign option 
bdsize 1.000          
ceoobd 0.248 1.000         
Busy 0.026 0.022 1.000        
tenure 0.082 0.156 0.049 1.000       
female 0.358 0.069 -0.009 -0.049 1.000      
Fsize 0.323 0.062 0.020 -0.029 0.195 1.000     
employ 0.376 0.181 0.015 0.140 0.119 0.188 1.000    
Roa 0.218 0.089 0.101 0.196 0.101 0.012 0.108 1.000   
foreign 0.052 -0.105 -0.050 -0.204 -0.064 -0.040 0.024 -0.075 1.000  
option 0.116 -0.029 0.026 0.032 0.017 0.079 0.191 -0.042 0.081 1.000 
* See section 4.2 for variable definitions        
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5. Results and Analysis  
 
In this chapter the results from our study are presented and analysed, based on the theoretical 
framework.  
 
5.1 Regression Analysis 
 
In order to lessen the effect of scale differences, we transform the CEO compensation, firm 
size and number of employees into natural logs (ln) and use the transformed variables in our 
multiple regression. This is consistent with previous research, such as Barro & Barro, 1990; 
Sloan, 1993; Talmor & Wallace, 2000; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003; Durante et al, 2005; 
among others. Thus, our multiple cross-sectional regression is: 
 
Formula (5.1) 
 
lnceocomp = β0 + β1bdsize+ β2ceoobd+ β3busy + β4tenure +  
β5female + β6lnfsize + β7lnemploy + β8roa +  
β9foreign + β10option + ε 
 
 
The results from our regression model, with CEO compensation as dependent variable and the 
board composition, discretion/complexity, firm performance and ownership structure 
variables as the independent variables, are presented in Table 5.1.  
 
 
Table 5.1 Regression of CEO compensation1 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value             Probability 
constant 10.562 0.367 28.787 0.000* 
Board composition     
bdsize 0.013 0.020 0.622                      0.534 
ceoobd -0.100 0.066 -1.515                      0.131 
busy 0.189 0.143 1.322                      0.187 
tenure -0.170 0.130 -1.308                      0.192 
female 0.301 0.274 1.097                      0.274 
Discretion and complexity    
lnfsize  0.151 0.022 6.830 0.000* 
lnemploy 0.128 0.021 5.995 0.000* 
Firm performance     
Roa -0.148 0.169 -0.876                       0.382  
Ownership structure     
foreign 0.109 0.075 1.464                      0.144   
option 0.201 0.064 3.170 0.002* 
Observations = 267 R2-adj = 0.610 F-stat = 42.631 Prob. (F-stat) = 0.000* 
1See section 4.1 and 4.2 for variable definitions    
* Statistically significant at 1 % level    
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As mentioned earlier, it is important to test for the assumptions underlying the linear 
regression model before making any interpretation of the results52. To test for linearity, which 
is the first assumption underlying the linear regression model, we used Ramsey’s RESET test 
and White’s heteroscedasticity test including cross terms. Both test results shows that we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of linearity, thus the model is linear53. The fact that we have 
variation in the x variables and a constant term is included in the regression equation, 
assumption two and three are fulfilled. Also assumption four is fulfilled, since the x variates in 
our study are given and non-random, thus the estimators are considered to be both unbiased 
and consistent.  
 
The fifth assumption, the assumption of homoscedasticity, is tested with White’s test for 
heteroscedasticity. We reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity54, i.e. the errors are not 
constant, why we included White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error estimates, 
which solved the heteroscedasticity problem. Since our regression is a cross-sectional 
regression, the probability that the errors are correlated with one another is quite low. Thus, 
the sixth assumption, i.e. autocorrelation, is probably not violated. Since assumption two to 
six holds, the estimators are considered to be most efficient, i.e. the OLS procedure gives the 
best linear unbiased estimates (BLUE).  
 
The number of regression coefficients is ten, which is considerably less than the number of 
observations of 267, thus the seventh assumption also holds. The eighth assumption, 
normality, is tested for with the Jarque-Bera test and the result shows that we reject the null 
hypothesis of normality55, i.e. the data is not normally distributed. Because of our large 
sample size, 267 observations56, and the trade-off that exists between the need to remove 
outlying observations and the notion that each data point represent useful information, we do 
not remove any outliers, which otherwise could have solved the non-normality problem. The 
distribution has a skewness close to zero, indicating that the distribution is symmetric about 
its mean value, and a kurtosis somewhat above three, indicating that our data has a leptokurtic 
distribution. The ninth and last assumption, the assumption of multicollinearity, occurs when 
the independent variables are highly correlated with each other. The correlation coefficients 
presented in Table 4.3 indicates that there is no multicollinearity present in the data57.  
 
Our model explains the cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation by 61 percent, 
indicated by the adjusted58 R2, which, according to Ramanathan (1998, p 103) as well as 
Brooks (2003, p 140), is a quite high value for a cross-sectional regression. The adjusted R2 is 
similar to those of Cyert et al (1997), 51 to 58 percent, Core et al (1999), 53 to 62 percent and 
Cahan et al (2005), 68 percent. However, due to differences in the sample and variables the 
adjusted R2 is not strictly comparable (Brooks, 2003, p 137). As indicated by the F-statistic 
probability, our overall model is strongly significant. The constant is also strongly significant, 
indicating that the average CEO compensation is different from zero.  
                                                
52
 See 2.2.4 Assumptions underlying OLS. 
53
 See Appendix D Results from test for assumptions; Table D.1 Test for linearity. 
54
 See Appendix D Results from test for assumptions; Table D.2 Test for heteroscedasticity. 
55
 See Appendix D Results from test for assumptions; Table D.3 Test for normality. 
56
 Sufficiently large sample sizes will follow the appropriate distributions, even in the absence of error normality 
(Brooks, 2003, p 182). 
57
 A small degree of correlation will almost always exist, but will not cause too much loss of precision (Brooks, 
2003, p 190).  
58Adjusted R2, instead of R2, is preferable when comparing models with different dependent variables, because 
the adjusted R2 takes the loss of degrees of freedom, associated with adding extra variables, into account 
(Brooks, 2003, p 137). 
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5.1.1 Board Structure  
 
The result for our five independent board variables, board size, CEO on board, busy directors, 
tenure of the directors and female directors, are here presented and analyzed. 
 
 
Board Size 
 
The first board structure variable, bdsize, is not significant, indicating that the level of CEO 
compensation is not related to the size of the board. This is inconsistent with both theory (Kim 
& Nofsinger, 2004, p 38) and financial research (Jensen, 1993; Huther, 1996; Yermack, 1996; 
Vafeas, 2000), which suggests that large boards are less effective at monitoring than small 
boards59. Our findings are also inconsistent with those of Core et al (1999), Talmor & Wallace 
(2000) and Cahan et al (2005) who all found a significantly positive relationship between 
board size and CEO compensation. However, our result is consistent with Cyert et al (1997) 
who found little evidence that larger board size contributes to an overcompensation of the 
CEO. Thus, the importance of the recommendation in the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance (2004), that a board should consist of a sufficient number of directors that 
enables an easy and efficient work, could somewhat be questioned, since there is no 
relationship between board size and CEO compensation60 in firms listed on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange.  
 
 
CEO on Board 
 
Surprisingly, the ceoobd variable is not significant, indicating that the CEO payment is 
indifferent to whether the CEO is a member of the board or not. This is inconsistent with the 
findings of Cahan et al (2005), who found a significant positive relationship between CEO on 
board and CEO compensation. It is also inconsistent with Cyert et al (1997) and Core et al 
(1999), although they looked at the CEO as the chairman of the board.  
 
 
Busy  
 
Consistent with Cahan et al (2005), but in contrary to Core et al (1999), we find that busy is 
not significant, which indicates that directors with three or more directorships do not appear to 
be less effective than other directors. According to Cahan et al (2005) this could be explained 
by the fact that busy is a proxy for a director’s expertise. Thus, the risk of reduced 
effectiveness when serving on many boards is compensated by the positive effect of the 
director’s knowledge and skills (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, despite our result we do 
not find the recommendation in the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2004), that a 
director should not hold more directorships than he/she can manage, questionable, since the 
positive effects at some point will probably be outbalanced by the negative effects.  
 
 
Tenure 
 
In contrast to theory, which says that a decrease in the tenure of the directors could lead to an 
increase in board effectiveness61, we find that the tenure and CEO compensation are not 
significantly related. Thus, the tenure of the directors does not affect the level of CEO 
compensation. This may be explained by the fact that the loss of effectiveness, that follows 
                                                
59
 See 2.4.1 for further discussion about board size and its effectiveness. 
60
 A large board is less effective (Yermack, 1996) and CEOs in firms with weaker governance structure receives 
greater compensation (Core et al, 1999). 
61
 Se 2.4.1 for further discussion about tenure and its affect on board effectiveness. 
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from being a member of the board for a long time period, is compensated by an increased 
knowledge about the firm or an increase in the emotional boundary with the firm. However, 
the result may be different if a longer time period or a percentage of tenure within the board is 
studied.  
 
 
Female 
 
We found no significant relationship between the presence of female directors and the level of 
CEO compensation, which is consistent with Durante et al (2005) who found no relationship 
between female directors and firm value. Our results differ from previous research that 
suggests that a diversified board is better in monitoring (Biggins, 1999) and that there is a 
significant positive relationship between female directors  and firm value (Singh et al, 2001; 
Carter et al, 2003; Erhardt et al, 2003). However, the low percentage of female directors, 14 
percent62, may explain the insignificant result.   
 
5.1.2 Managerial Discretion and Task Complexity 
 
In order to evaluate how managerial discretion and task complexity affects CEO 
compensation, we present and analyze the results for the two control variables; firm size and 
number of employees. 
 
 
Firm Size 
 
Consistent with theory, which suggests that CEO compensation increase if the CEO engages 
in empire building63, we found a strongly significant and positive relationship between fsize 
and CEO compensation. Our result is also consistent with previous research, suggesting that 
firm size is a determinant for CEO compensation (e.g. Rosen, 1981:1982; Cyert et al, 1997; 
Core et al, 1999; Talmor & Wallace, 2000; Cahan et al, 2005) This indicates that firm size is a 
good measure of managerial discretion and task complexity and that CEOs in large firms get 
paid more than their counterparts in smaller firms.  
 
 
Number of Employees 
 
Together with the firm size variable, employ is one of the most important determinants for 
CEO compensation, with a strongly significant and positive coefficient. The result indicates 
that CEOs in firms with a large number of employees get paid more than their counterparts in 
firms with fewer employees. Thus, if number of employees is a good measure of managerial 
discretion and task complexity, this result is consistent with theory.  
 
5.1.3 Firm Performance 
 
In order to determine whether firm performance can explain CEO compensation, we present 
and analyze the results for the control variable roa.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
62
 Se Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics. 
63
 Se 2.4.2 for further discussion about the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation. 
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Return on Assets 
 
The coefficient for roa is not significant, indicating that the CEO compensation is not affected 
by profitability. However, this result is somewhat puzzling, because many CEOs have a 
performance-based compensation as a part of their total compensation, which should indicate 
that CEO compensation would increase when profitability increase. The insignificant result is 
also inconsistent with previous studies (e.g. Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Sloan, 1993; 
Joskow & Rose, 1994; Cyert et al, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Talmor & Wallace, 2000; Cahan et 
al, 2005). The insignificant result may indicate that the performance-based compensation is 
incorrectly designed in many firms. 
 
5.1.4 Ownership Structure 
 
The results for the control variables, foreign ownership and option program, are presented and 
analyzed in order to determine whether the firms ownership structure affects CEO 
compensation.  
 
 
Foreign 
 
The coefficient for foreign is not significant. Thus, whether the firm has any foreign block 
holder, owing more than ten percent of the votes, does not affect the level of CEO 
compensation. The result is inconsistent with the findings of Oxelheim & Randøy (2003), 
who found that outside Anglo-American board members have significant impacts on firm 
value. It is also inconsistent with the fact that CEO compensation often is higher outside of 
Sweden (Kim & Nofsinger, 2004, p 18).  
 
 
Option 
 
The last independent variable, option, is strongly significant64. However, in contrast with our 
predicted sign, the presence of stock options is positively related to CEO compensation, 
which indicates that the CEO compensation is higher in firms where the CEO is also rewarded 
stock options, than in firms without any stock options. Since firm performance is positively 
related to equity-based CEO compensation (Mehran, 1995), this could be explained by the 
fact that firms that are issuing stock options are highly profitable firms that also pay a high 
total CEO compensation. However, this contradicts the insignificant relationship between 
ROA and CEO compensation. 
 
5.2 Category Analysis 
 
In order to examine the relative explanatory power of the different classes of independent 
variables, i.e. board structure, managerial discretion/task complexity, firm performance and 
ownership structure, Talmor & Wallace (2000) and Cahan et al (2005) computed the adjusted 
R2 for the different categories individually. Their result shows that the discretion/complexity 
variable has the highest explanatory power, followed by board structure, ownership structure 
and last firm performance. As Talmor & Wallace (2000) and Cahan et al (2005) we 
performed a category analysis, and found that each category differs in their incremental 
                                                
64
 A test for differences in the estimated slope for the option variable has also been performed, but since the 
result is not statistically significant, no further discussion will be made. 
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explanatory power. However, when only the board structure variables are included in the 
regression, board size is strongly significant, indicating that board size and CEO 
compensation are positively related. When all variables are included board size is no longer 
significantly related to CEO compensation, which indicates that board size probably is a 
proxy for firm size, number of employees or CEO stock options.  
 
The result from our category analysis shows the importance of testing the variables in a 
multiple regression framework, since board size is significantly related to CEO compensation 
when only board structure variables are included in the regression, but not when all variables 
are included. Thus, it also shows that it is not appropriate to draw conclusions about the board 
structures influence on CEO payment, from the category analysis, such as Talmor & Wallace 
(2000) and Cahan et al (2005) do65. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
65
 Based on their category analysis they suggested that the board composition variables are important 
determinants for CEO compensation. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter the conclusions from our study and proposals about additional research are 
presented.  
 
6.1 Discussions and Conclusions 
 
We examine whether the board structure variables; board size, CEO on board, busy directors, 
the tenure of the directors and number of female directors, influences the level of CEO 
compensation. Similar to prior research (e.g. Cyert et al, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Talmor & 
Wallace, 2000; Cahan et al, 2005) we include three other categories of explanatory variables, 
i.e. managerial discretion/task complexity, performance and ownership variables, which serve 
as control variables. 
 
Our study encompasses the relationship between board structure and CEO compensation, for 
the year 2004, and our final sample consists of 267 companies listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange. Inconsistent with prior research, we find no significant relation between any board 
structure variable and CEO compensation. Instead, CEO compensation is significantly and 
positively related to firm size, as measured by the firm’s total assets, number of employees 
and the presence of CEO stock options. Thus, one conclusion from our study is that managers 
engaging in empire building probably will receive higher compensation than managers who 
do not engage in such activities, which is consistent with theory66. Furthermore, the positive 
relationship between the presence of CEO stock options and CEO compensation, which is 
inconsistent with our predicted sign, indicates that CEO stock options is not a compensation 
for lower CEO pay. Interestingly, the insignificant relationship between return on assets and 
CEO compensation may indicate that the performance-based compensation is incorrectly 
designed in many firms. 
 
The category analysis shows that board size is significantly related to CEO compensation 
when only the board structure variables are included in the regression, but is not significantly 
related when also control variables are included. We thus conclude that board size may proxy 
for firm size, i.e. that larger firms also have larger boards. However, since none of our board 
structure variables are significant, we can not draw any conclusions about the board structure 
variables incremental explanatory power, such as Talmor & Wallace (2000) and Cahan et al 
(2005) do.  
 
The overall results suggest that board structure is not an important factor for determining the 
level of CEO compensation in companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, after 
controlling for other non-board factors affecting CEO compensation. Thus, we cannot find 
any relation between a weak board and higher CEO compensation, which is inconsistent with 
previous research.  
 
Our study contributes to prior academic research, since no one has examined the relation 
between board structure and CEO compensation in companies listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange in 2004. Thus, our study provides evidence that may be useful in the policy debate 
regarding corporate governance.  
 
                                                
66
 Se 2.4.2 Managerial discretion and task complexity. 
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6.2 Additional Research 
 
It would be of interest to conduct a study for previous years, since our study encompasses the 
relationship between board structure and CEO compensation for the year 2004. Thus, it would 
be possible to compare our results with results from previous years in order to see whether the 
results are consistent over years. It would also be of interest to compare our results with 
similar studies in other countries, i.e. a comparison with countries from the four different 
corporate governance systems (the Anglo-Saxon system, the Germanic system, the Latin 
system and the Japanese system).   
 
The relationship between the existence of independent and dependent directors and CEO 
compensation, in firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, would also be of interest to 
study. Likewise, whether the existence of institutional owners affects the level of CEO 
compensation could be a subject for further research.  
 
It would also be of interest to study the differences in board structure influences on CEO 
compensation between those companies that today are affected by the code and those that are 
not, since the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance is not yet comprised to all companies 
listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Similar to Cahan et al (2005) it would also be of 
interest to study the differences between public and private sector companies in Sweden, and 
to examine whether the results differ if the value of CEO stock options is included in the total 
CEO compensation.  
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Appendix A:  
Conversion Rates 
 
Table A.1 Average Conversion Rate: 01/01/2004 - 31/12/2004* 
 
Currency  Average conversion rate 
USD 7.350 
USD** 7.505 
EUR 9.127 
GBP 13.461 
ISK 0.105 
CHF 5.509 
* FXHistory, a foreign exchange database, was used to obtain the conversion rates 
** Average Conversion Rate for 01/10/2003 - 30/09/2004 
 
 
Table A.2 Conversion Rate: 31/12/2004* 
 
Currency Conversion rate 
USD 6.614 
USD** 7.351 
EUR 9.023 
GBP 12.742 
ISK 0.108 
CHF 5.339 
* FXHistory, a foreign exchange database, was used to obtain the conversion rates 
** Conversion Rate for 30/09/2004 
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Appendix B:  
Companies included in the regression analysis, a total of 267 
 
ABB Cherry IFS 
Academedia Clas Ohlson Industrivärlden 
AcandoFrontec Cloetta Fazer Intellecta 
A-Com  Concordia Intentia 
ACSC Consilium Intrum Justitia 
Active Biotech  CTT System Investor  
Active Capital  Cyber Com ITAB 
Addnode Daydream JC 
Addtech Diamyd Med Jeeves 
Affärstrategerna Digital Vision JM 
Ainax Doro Johnson Pump 
Alfa Laval Duroc Kabe 
Anoto Group Elanders Karlshamn 
Artimplant Electrolux  Karo Bio 
Aspiro Elekta Kaupthing Bank 
Assa Abloy  ElektronikGruppen Kinnevik 
Astra Zeneca  Enea Klippan 
Atlas Copco  Eniro Klövern 
Audiodev Enlight KMT 
Autoliv  Ericsson  KnowIT 
Avanza Expanda Kungsleden 
Axfood Fagerhult Lagercrantz 
Axis Fast Partner LaTour 
Ballingslöv Feelgood LB Icon 
Beijer Alma Fenix Outdoor Ledstiernan 
Beijer Electronic Fingerprint Lindex 
Bergman & Beving Finnveden Ljungberg 
Biacore Framfab Lundbergs 
Bilia Föreningssparbanken  Lundin Petroleum 
Billerud G&L Beijer Luxonen 
Biogaia Gambro  Malmbergs 
Bioinvent Getinge Mandator 
Biolin Geveko Meda 
Biophausia Glocalnet Medicover Holding  
Biotage Gorthon Lines  Medivir 
Boliden Gunnebo Mekonomen 
Bong Ljungdahl H&M Metro Int.  
Borås Wäveri Hagströmer & Qviberg Micronic 
Boss Media Haldex Midway 
Brinova Havsfrun Millicom 
Brio Heba Modul 1 Data 
Broström Hexagon MSC Konsult 
BTS Group HiQ Internationell MTG 
Bure Equity HL Display MTV Produktion 
C F Berg Holmen  MultiQ Int. 
Capio HQ Fonder Munters 
Capona Hufvudstaden NCC 
Cardo Human Care NEA 
Carnegie Höganäs Nefab 
CashGuard I.A.R. Systems Neonet 
Castellum IBS Net Insight 
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Appendix B:   
   
NetOnNet Sardus Wedins Skor 
New Wave Group SAS Westergyllen 
Nexus SCA  Viking Tele 
Nibe Scania  Wilh. Sonesson 
Nilörngr ScanMining Vitrolife 
Nobel Biocare  Scribona VLT 
Nobia SEB  WM-Data 
Nocom Seco Tools Volvo  
Nokia Sectra Vostok Nafta  
Nolato Securitas  Xponcard Group 
Nordea Bank Semcon Ångpanneföreningen 
Nordnet Senea  Öresund 
North Atlantic Natural Resources Sensys Traffic  
Note Sigma  
Novestra Sign On i Stockholm  
Novotek Sintercast  
Observer Skandia Försäkrings   
OEM Skanditek  
OMX  Skanska   
Onetwocom SKF   
Opcon Skistar  
Optimail Softronic  
Orc Software SSAB  
Oriflame Cosmetics  Stora Enso   
Ortivus Strålfors  
Partnertech Studsvik  
PEAB Sweco  
Pergo Svedbergs  
Poolia Swedish Match   
Powerwave Tech  Svenska Handelsbanken   
Precise Biometrichs Switchcore  
Prevas Svolder  
Pricer Säki  
Proact IT Group Tele2  
Probi Teleca  
Proffice Telelogic  
Profilgruppen TeliaSonera   
Protect Data Teligent  
Q-Med Thalamus  
Ratos Ticket  
Raysearch Lab Tieto Enator   
Readsoft Traction  
Resco Transcom WW Ser   
Retail & Brand Trelleborg   
Riddarhyttan Tricorona  
Rottneros Trio  
Rörvik Timber Tripep  
Saab TV 4  
SalusAnsvar Unibet   
Sandvik  Wallenstam  
Sapa VBG  
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Appendix C: 
Size and Composition of the Board according to the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
 3.2 Size and Composition of the Board 
 
The board should have a size and composition that enable it to embrace the various 
qualifications and experience needed and to meet the independence criteria required to 
manage the company’s affairs effectively and independently. The renewal of the board 
should be paced with due consideration for the development tof the company’s 
operations as well as for the need for continuity in the work of the board. 
 
 3.2.1  With the company’s operations, phase of development, and other conditions 
taken into consideration, the board is to have an appropriate composition, 
exhibiting diversity and breadth in the directors’ qualifications, experience and 
background. An equal gender distribution on the board is to be an aim. 
 
 3.2.2  The board is not to exceed the size that will allow it to employ simple and 
effective working methods. There are to be no deputies to the directors chosen 
by the shareholders’ meeting. 
 
 3.2.3  No more than one person from senior management may be a member of the 
board. 
 
 3.2.4  The majority of the directors elected by the shareholders’ meeting are to be 
independent of the company and its management. A director is not to be 
considered independent if he or she: 
 
 is the managing director, or in the preceding five years has been the 
managing director, of the company or associated enterprises, 
 
 is employed, or in the preceding three years has been employed, in the 
company or an associated enterprise, 
 
 receives significant remuneration for advice or services in addition to 
board work from the company or an associated enterprise or from 
someone in the senior management,  
 
 has, or in recent years has had, extensive business ties or other 
extensive financial dealings with the company or an associated 
enterprise, in his or her capacity as customer, supplier or part-owner, 
either personally or as part of the senior management or the board or 
by being a major partner in another enterprise having such a business 
relationship with the company, 
 
 is, or in the past three years has been, a partner or employee of the 
audit firm currently or then auditing the company or an associated 
enterprise, 
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 is part of senior management in another enterprise having a director 
who is part of senior management in the company, 
 
 has been a member of the board for more than twelve years, or 
 
 is a close relative or family associate of someone in the senior 
management or of   some other person as provided in the preceding 
clauses, if this person’s direct or indirect dealings with the company 
are sufficiently extensive andimportant that the director is not 
considered independent. 
 
An associated enterprise refers to an enterprise in which the company, directly 
or indirectly, holds at least 10 per cent of the shares or participation or the 
votes or a financial interest that gives the right to at least 10 per cent of the 
return of this enterprise. If the company has more than 50 per cent of the capital 
or votes in another enterprise, the company is considered to have indirect 
ownership of this enterprise’s ownership in other enterprises. 
 
  The fourth point is not to apply to the customary bank-client relationships. 
 
 
 3.2.5  At least two of the directors who are independent of the company and its 
management are also to be independent of the company’s major shareholders. A 
director who represents a major owner or is employed or a member of the board 
in a company that is a major shareholder is not considered independent. 
 
“A major shareholder” refers to owners who directly or indirectly control 10 
per cent or more of the shares or votes in the company. If one company has 
more than 50 per cent of the capital or votes in another company, the first 
company is considered to have indirect control of the second company’s 
ownership in other companies. 
 
 3.2.6  Members of the board are to be appointed for one year at a time. 
 
 
 3.3 Directors 
 
The director’s position in relation to the company is similar to that of a trustee. This 
means that the director is obliged to devote the time and the care and have the 
competence required to look after the interests of the company and its owners in the best 
possible manner. 
 
 3.3.1  A director is not to have so many other duties that he or she is unable to devote 
the necessary time and care to the company’s board work. 
 
 3.3.2  A director is to form an independent judgement on each matter considered by 
the board and to express the views and take the positions that follow from this 
judgement. A director is to request whatever supplementary information that he 
or she believes is necessary for the board to make well-founded decisions. 
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 3.3.3  A director is obliged to acquire the familiarity with the company’s operations, 
organisation, market, etc. needed to discharge his or her duties. 
 
 3.3.4  A new director is to receive the necessary introductory training about the 
company and any other training that the chair of the board and the director 
mutually consider appropriate. 
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Appendix D: 
Results from tests for assumptions 
 
Table D.1 Test for Linearity 
 
Test Test result  
Ramseys RESET test*  
     F-statistic 0.020 
     Prob. F(1,255) 0.887 
     Log Likelihood ratio 0.021 
     Prob. Chi-square (1) 0.884 
Whites heteroskedasticity test**  
     F-statistic 1.032 
     Prob. F(62,204) 0.425 
     Obs*R-squared 63.742 
     Prob. Chi-square (62) 0.415 
* Nr. of fitted terms = 1  
** Including cross terms  
 
 
Table D.2 Test for Heteroscedasticity 
 
Test Test result 
Whites heteroscedasticity test*  
     F-statistic 1.756 
     Prob. F(17,249) 0.034 
     Obs*R-squared 28.589 
     Prob. Chi-square (17) 0.038 
** Including no cross terms  
 
 
Table D.3 Test for Normality 
 
Test Test result 
Jarque-Bera normality test  
     Jarque-Bera 28.104 
     Probability 0.000 
     Skewness 0.061 
     Kurtosis 4.585 
* See Diagram D.1 for a diagram over the result 
 
 
Diagram D.1 Diagram from the normality test 
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Appendix E: 
The relative explanatory power of the different classes of independent variables 
 
Table E.1 Regression of CEO Compensation on Board Structure1 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value                  Prob. 
constant 13.162 0.172 76.411                  0.000* 
Board composition     
Ln 0.198 0.020 10.014                 0.000*   
ceoobd -0.045 0.085 -0.525               0.600  
busy 0.217 0.186 1.170               0.243 
tenure -0.042 0.164 -0.255               0.799 
female 0.489 0.355 1.376               0.170 
Observations = 267 R2-adj = 0.329 F-stat = 27.085 Prob. (F-stat) = 0.000* 
1See 4.2 for variable definitions    
* Significant at the 0.01 level    
 
 
Table E.2 Regression of CEO Compensation on Discretion/complexity1 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value                    Prob. 
constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
Discretion/complexity     
lnfsize 14.777 0.048 308.362 0.000* 
lnemploy 0.889 0.239 3.719 0.000* 
Observations = 267 R2-adj = 0.780 F-stat = 0.000 Prob. (F-stat) = 0.000* 
1See 4.2 for variable definitions    
* Significant at the 0.01 level    
 
 
Table E.3 Regression of CEO compensation on firm performance1 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value                    Prob. 
constant 0.889 0.239 3.719 0.000* 
Firm performance     
Roa 14.777 0.048 308.362 0.000* 
Observations = 267 R2-adj = 0.046 F-stat = 13.829 Prob. (F-stat) = 0.000* 
1See 4.2 for variable definitions    
* Significant at the 0.01 level    
 
 
Table E.4 Regression of CEO compensation on ownership structure1 
 
Variable Coeff. Std. Error t-value                    Prob. 
constant 0.445 0.094 4.723 0.000* 
Ownership structure     
foreign 14.539 0.070 206.454 0.000* 
option 0.121 0.110 1.101                   0.272 
Observations = 267 R2-adj = 0.078 F-stat = 12.265 Prob. (F-stat) = 0.000* 
1See 4.2 for variable definitions    
* Significant at the 0.01 level    
 
